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Abstract 
 
This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France. Even though a rights 
offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly using the 
relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the 
announcement of seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and 
insignificantly negative for public offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse 
selection effect is greater for rights issues than for public offerings, due to stronger 
underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that the share price effect is 
positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with prior 
concentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect 








































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     3  
1. Introduction 
Despite the lower flotation costs of rights issues, most U.S. firms choose public 
offerings to raise capital. This puzzling evidence is often referred to as the equity 
financing paradox. Several explanations have been put forward to explain this paradox, 
which suggest that rights offerings may be more expensive in other ways. These 
explanations include capital gains taxes (Smith, 1977), shareholder selling costs 
(Hansen, 1988), differences in prior share ownership (Hansen and Pinkerton, 1982) and 
adverse selection costs (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). 1 The purpose of this study is to 
provide new international evidence on the valuation effects and the costs associated 
with alternative flotation methods.  
The relative frequencies of rights issues and public offerings differ strongly 
across countries. For example, in the U.S., the overwhelming majority of corporations 
choose the firm commitment underwriting method. In Japan, according to Kang and 
Stulz (1996), 66% of the common stock offerings over the period 1985-1991 were 
public offerings. In most European countries and in Australia, rights issues are the 
primary flotation method. 2 In contrast to the U.S. results, several studies find a positive 
or a non-negative stock price reaction to the announcement of equity offerings in these 
countries.  
In this paper, we investigate seasoned equity offerings in France, where rights 
issues represented 90% of all common stock offerings over the period 1986-1996. Our 
sample includes uninsured rights, rights with standby underwriting and public offerings. 
                                                 
1   For a review, see Eckbo and Masulis (1995). 
2   See Loderer and Zimmerman (1987) for Switzerland, Hietala and Löyttyniemi (1991) for Finland,  
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Throughout the paper, we refer to issues without rights as public offerings. The French 
market has some distinctive characteristics, which motivate this study. While a rights 
offering is the primary flotation method in France, French firms select the public 
offering method more frequently than in other European equity markets. French firms 
relied on rights offerings almost exclusively until 1985. But this has changed recently, 
with the proportion of public offerings increasing from 4.84% over the 1986-1989 
period to 16.84% over the 1990-1996 period. 3 We examine the evidence on flotation 
costs, and confirm the existence of an equity financing paradox in France. The growing 
preference for the more expensive public offering method is documented and potential 
explanations are examined. 
We investigate the market reactions to several categories of equity issue 
announcements in France. We also examine the determinants of the market reaction to 
these issue announcements by means of cross-sectional regressions. Our results indicate 
that rights offerings by French firms lead to a more negative signal of share value than 
do public offerings. For the 1986-1996 period, we find significant two-day average 
excess returns of –0.74% for standby rights issues and –1.11% for uninsured rights. 
Public offerings generate an insignificant negative return. Further, when we look at the 
more recent 1990-1996 period, we find significant two-day average excess returns of –
1.28% for standby rights issues, –2.84% for uninsured rights, and an insignificant 
negative return for public offerings. Our results suggest that the choice of a rights issue 
in France should be seen as a more negative signal of share value, especially in the more 
recent period.  
                                                 
3   This proportion is even larger and reaches about 50% when we consider the period 1997-1999, which 
is not included in our sample. During the whole period, the public offering flotation method was often 
chosen by French firms for their issues of units of common stocks and warrants. These issues are not 
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The offer price for French public offerings is determined four days on average 
before the beginning of the issue period. Further, the issue price is subject to regulatory 
constraints. These constraints increase the risk for the underwriter, who will only agree 
to underwrite the public offering if he assesses that the stock’s fundamental value is 
higher than the offer price. We argue that French public offerings are characterised by 
stronger underwriter certification and monitoring than U.S. firm commitments and that 
this may reduce the adverse selection effect. Our evidence can be compared to the 
results of Cooney, Kato and Schallheim (1997) who find a positive abnormal return on 
the announcement date of Japanese firm commitments and to the results of Slovin, 
Sushka and Lai (2000) who find a significant positive announcement return for U.K. 
placings. 
Further, we find that the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings is (i) 
more negative when the issue size is large and the preannouncement abnormal 
performance of the stock is high, and (ii) more positive when the gross proceeds of the 
issue are used to finance an acquisition or an investment. 
We focus on differences in corporate control motives that may explain the 
choice between alternative flotation methods, and provide evidence on the effects of 
blockholders 4 renouncing their rights to purchase shares. The French equity market, 
like most European equity markets, is dominated by closely held firms. Hansen and 
Pinkerton (1982) argue that firms with concentrated share ownership will choose rights 
issues. Consistent with that argument, we find that the percentage of shares held by the 
main shareholder in France is significantly greater for rights offers.  
                                                 
4   We call blockholders all the shareholders who hold more than 5% of the shares at the date of the issue 
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In France, the blockholders must disclose in the issue prospectuses their 
intention to subscribe or to renounce their new share allocation. Our evidence shows 
that share allocations not taken up by blockholders are much larger for underwritten 
public offerings than for rights and standby offerings. This is consistent with the Eckbo 
and Masulis (1992) results, who show that rights offerings become more costly and less 
attractive as take-up by current shareholders falls. In their model, the issuing firms show 
adverse selection to a degree that, all else being equal, is inversely related to the current 
shareholder take-up. Then, the market reaction should be negatively related to the 
shareholder take-up. Our evidence confirms this prediction for the firms that are not 
closely held by a controlling shareholder. 5 For the closely held firms, blockholders 
take-up renouncements are favourable news for external investors, which positively 
affects the market reaction. We conjecture that increasing ownership dispersion 
enhances share value for these firms, by increasing incentives for management 
monitoring and especially by attenuating conflicts of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders. The likelihood of tunneling (transfer of resources out of the 
company to its controlling shareholder), which is frequently a problem in civil-law 
countries, such as France (see, for instance, Johnson et al. 2000), could be particularly 
reduced. 
We also report that public offerings are generally characterized by strong 
underwriter certification due to high risk born by underwriters, especially when there 
are large renouncements by blockholders. This certification may more than offset the 
greater adverse selection costs associated with public issues and explain the lack of 
market reaction at the announcement of a public issue. 
                                                 








































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     7  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the characteristics of French seasoned 
equity offerings are described. In section 3, we give evidence on flotation costs. Section 
4 shows evidence on the valuation effect of offering announcements. Section 5 puts 
forward factors explaining market reaction on the date of announcement. The summary 
and conclusions are given in section 6. 
2. Institutional framework and data 
2.1. The French institutional setting 
A seasoned equity offering has to be approved at an extraordinary general 
shareholders’ meeting. All decisions at the extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting 
need a majority of 66.6% of the voting rights.6 French law grants shareholders a right to 
purchase new shares, but the extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting may waive 
this pre-emptive right. Approval for an issue may be given for a maximum amount to be 
raised within five years (rights), three years (without rights) or 26 months (when the 
type of security and flotation method is not specified). Pre-emptive rights cannot be 
permanently waived by means of charter amendment. 
The French institutional setting for public offerings differs from the U.S. setting in 
three ways. First, shares are initially offered to current shareholders on a pro-rata basis, 
for ten days on average, but this purchase priority cannot be traded like a right. 7 
                                                 
6   Decisions made during a general shareholders’ meeting require a majority of 50% of the voting rights. 
Extraordinary general shareholders’ meetings are required to alter the charter.  
7   Under these conditions, at first glance, outside investors can subscribe only to the part of the issue that 
is not reserved for current shareholders. Nevertheless, if current shareholders do renounce their 
allocation, the initial part offered to external investors can be increased. The rate of increase depends 
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Secondly, there is a regulatory constraint on the issue price. Thirdly, public offerings are 
generally underwritten through a standby-underwriting contract.  
In French public offerings, the offer price and the size of the issue are decided on 
the most recent COB date, 8 which is on average four days before the beginning of the 
issue period. The underwriter incurs the risk of adverse changes in share prices from the 
COB date to the end of the average ten-day priority period. In the U.S. firm 
commitment method, the offer price is set the day before the public offering date and 
the offering is very short, usually just a few hours. The French constraints on the issue 
price increase the risk for the underwriters, who will only underwrite a public offering if 
their assessment of the true value of the stock is higher than the offer price. The 
existence of a priority period for current shareholders increases the underwriter's risk by 
postponing the end of the issue period. As a result, underwriter certification in French 
public offerings may be stronger than in U.S. firm commitments. From the perspective 
of the Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) model, underwriters of French public 
offerings may be effective monitors: overvalued firms may be forced to choose rights 
issues or uninsured public offerings. 
 
2.2. Equity issues in France over the period 1986-1996 
All equity issues taking place in the French market can be identified through the 
annual reports of the COB. Empirical tests are run for offers made over the 1986-1996 
period. Prices are extracted from the Euronext database. In our initial sample, 590 
equity issues from 1986 to 1996 are examined and classified by their characteristics. 
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-  The issue involves a single type of security and does not come with a stock 
dividend; units of common stock and warrant offerings are excluded as well; 
-  The issue does not involve a common stock reduction or a restructuring plan; 
-  The firm does not make important new releases, such as earnings, at the time of the 
issue announcement. 9 
These criteria produce a sample of 219 offerings described in table 1, of which 90% are 
rights issues and 10% are public offerings. In France, most seasoned equity issues, 
whether rights or not, are underwritten. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
 
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the sample. The characteristics of the new issues 
are reported in the registration statement filed with the COB and include offering 
proceeds, subscription price, number of current shares, underwriters’ name and 
shareholdings. The company also provides an estimate of the flotation costs.  
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
The average size of an equity rights offering is 351 million FF and the average size of a 
public offering is 1241 million FF. On average, the subscription price is 80% of the 
prevailing stock price (78% for rights issues and 95% for public offerings). French firms 
                                                                                                                                               
8   The COB (Commission des Opérations de Bourse) plays the same role as the SEC in the US. 
9   French firms quite often announce equity issues at the same time, or immediately after earnings 
publications. This evidence is consistent with Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991), who find that 
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are required to fix the rights subscription price at the agreement date, which is on 
average 10 days before the beginning of the subscription period. The subscription 
period lasts for 15 days on average. The subscription price in public offerings is set 
nearer to the beginning of the issue period (on average 4 days before), and the 
subscription period is shorter (on average 8 days). This relatively early price setting date 
in France compared to the U.S. explains why the issuer and the underwriter put more 
effort into anticipating the secondary market price when setting the offer price. The 
average number of shares offered, as a percentage of outstanding and new shares, 
is 23.47% (24.12% for rights issues and 17.73% for public offerings). It is interesting to 
note that the choice of flotation method varies from country to country though it is 
influenced by the size of firms. For instance, in the U.K., according to Slovin, Sushka 
and Lai (2000), firms that choose placings are very small relative to rights issuers. In the 
U.S., uninsured rights issuers are small firms, but no significant difference in issuer size 
appears between standby rights issuers and firm commitments issuers (Eckbo and 
Masulis, 1992). In France, large firms prefer public offers to standby rights, which, in 
turn, are preferred to uninsured rights. 
 
2.3. Ownership structure and expected shareholder take-up 
Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) show that U.S. firms with more concentrated share 
ownership tend to choose rights issues. Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) show that 
in Norway, the average percentage of outstanding equity held by the 20 largest 
shareholders varies from 54% over the 1980-1984 period to 61% over the 1985-1993 
period. They find little evidence that the average ownership characteristics vary 
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held by the main shareholder in France is significantly lower for the underwritten public 
offerings compared to alternative flotation methods (29.78% versus 47.32%). The major 
blockholders are financial institutions (36.1% of offerings), a family or an individual 
investor (16.4% of offerings), another firm (42% of offerings) and the state (1.8% of 
offerings). Only four offerings in our sample involve privatization activities. We 
checked that these issues do not behave differently to non-privatization SEOs. The 
percentage of shares held by blockholders before the offering exceeds 50% regardless 
the flotation method, and stays above 50% after the offering. For rights issues (public 
offerings) this percentage is 65.17% (57.35%) before and 62.94% (55.57%) after the 
offering. 
 
[Insert table 3] 
 
As highlighted by Eckbo and Masulis (1992), current shareholder demand for 
new equity offerings plays an important role in the decision on flotation method. 
Managers expecting low shareholder participation select firm commitments. Firms with 
a high (medium) expected shareholder take-up choose uninsured rights (standby rights).  
Our evidence shows that, on average, 28.8% of the issues lead to blockholder 
renouncements, either total or partial. The share allocation not taken up by 
blockholders, when different from zero, averages 62.53% for underwritten public 
offerings and 33.67% for other flotation methods. The percentage of the issue offered to 
external investors is largest for underwritten public offerings (62.9%), followed by 
standby rights issues (46.9%) and finally uninsured rights offerings (37.9%). Uninsured 
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blockholders offer their guarantee for all or part of the issue and in this way substitute 
bank underwriting. The evidence is consistent with the results of Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992). 
Despite blockholder renouncements, the average percentage of shares held by 
blockholders remains above 50% after the equity offering. 10 Hostile takeovers are 
therefore very difficult unless one or more blockholders participate. Increased 
shareholder dispersion may not lead to disciplinary effects, because ownership remains 
concentrated, on average, after the offering. However, even if all the blockholders 
together own a large part of the shares after the offering, the controlling shareholder 
may own less than 50%. Moreover, in France, some decisions require a majority of 




3. Evidence on flotation costs 
Table 2 shows average relative costs for the different flotation methods. The French 
flotation costs seem much lower in relative value than those reported by Slovin, Sushka 
and Lai (2000) for U.K. issues or Eckbo and Masulis (1995) for U.S. offerings. These 
authors show that the direct flotation costs of public underwritten offerings are over 6% 
of the issue proceeds, but only 4% for standby rights offerings and 2% for uninsured 
rights offerings. However, our results are very similar to Singh’s (1997) findings for 
                                                 
10  For instance, suppose that blockholders hold 60% of the shares and decide to subscribe to 50% of 
their subscription rights. If the percentage of change in shares is 25%, then blockholders still own 
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U.S. rights issues: he reports an average underwriting fee of 1.44% and other expenses 
of 1.02% of the gross proceeds. In France, the part of the offering subscribed to by 
outside investors, which is the most costly part of the issue, is much lower than in the 
United States. When we consider the total flotation costs as a percentage of the public 
gross proceeds, that is, the part of the offering not taken up by the main shareholders of 
the firm, the figures are much closer to the U.S. data. 
The results of U.S. studies show that flotation costs are higher for firm 
commitments, even after checking for the issue characteristics (see, for instance, Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1995). Public offerings are also more expensive than rights issues in 
France. We compare flotation costs for the two flotation methods after checking for the 
issue and firm characteristics. Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates in cross-sectional 
regressions on the issue characteristics.  
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
The regression intercept is positive and significant, which indicates a fixed 
component of flotation expenses. Our results show that the costs of public offerings are 
significantly higher than those of rights issues. The equity financing paradox is 
therefore confirmed in France: a growing proportion of French firms issuing common 
stock choose the relatively more expensive public offering method over the less 
expensive rights method.  
The flotation costs, in relative value, decrease with the gross proceeds of the offer, as 
a result of economies of scale, and increase with the percentage of the offering that is 
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blockholders: the administrative costs and the banking costs are higher for issues where 
a large fraction is offered to the public. Finally, the flotation costs were lower during the 
1990-1996 period. Until the mid-eighties, flotation fees, and especially underwriting 
fees, were set at a virtually fixed percentage of the gross proceeds (2.5% for the 
underwriting fees) with underwriters compensated only marginally for the different 
levels of offering risk. The growing competition among banks due to regulatory changes 
and the privatisation of several banks caused flotation costs to decrease over time. 
4. Valuation effects of equity offering announcements 
Stock price reaction to seasoned equity offerings made by U.S. firms has been 
extensively examined. A large number of studies of US seasoned equity offerings show 
that announcements are associated with a decrease in the stock price of firms, especially 
for firm commitments. For example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) show that share prices of industrial issuers decrease by 3% over the two-
day announcement period. 11 In other countries, less evidence exists on the valuation 
effect of equity issues announcements. In Japan, for instance, Kang and Stulz (1996) 
report a significantly positive reaction of 0.45% on the announcement of public 
offerings. In most European countries, empirical studies on issue announcements find 
positive or insignificant negative market reactions, e.g., +1.55%  (standby rights) and 
+0.23% but insignificant (uninsured rights) in Norway (Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen, 
1997) and +0.64% for rights issues for non financial firms in Germany (Gebhardt and 
Heiden, 1998). According to Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000), there is a negative 
announcement effect for British rights offerings (-2.9%), but a positive effect (+3.3%) 
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for placings, a distinct offering method with few similarities to U.S. firm commitments. 
These different findings seem puzzling. We shall try to explain them by examining the 
importance of bank certification and corporate control.  
 
4.1. Event-study methodology 
A standard event-study is performed in order to measure the average impact on 
French stock prices of seasoned equity offering announcements, where day 0 is the 
announcement date. If Rit  is the observed logarithmic return for security i and  Rmt  the 
market index return at date t , 12 the excess return can be calculated by the difference 
between Rit  and a benchmark period return Nit, which corresponds to a stock’s normal 
daily return in the absence of any event. Three benchmark returns are used: the market 
index return, the stock’s mean return measured over an estimation period prior to the 
event period and the market-adjusted stock return. The parameters 13 are estimated over 
event days - 220 through - 21 days before the announcement ( ) t = 0 . The cross-
sectional mean excess return () RAMt is then calculated for each event date over 40 days 
around the announcement date. In order to know if mean excess returns are significantly 
different from 0, the null hypothesis ( : ) H RAMt 0 0 =  is tested. Two parametric tests are 
                                                 
12  The market index return used is the SBF (Société des Bourses Françaises) index that is calculated 
over the 250 most liquid securities in the Paris market. The index return takes into account the 
reinvestment of dividends. 
13  In the case of the market-adjusted return, the coefficients are estimated by using the OLS values over 
the estimation period. However, because of non-synchronous trading, OLS estimates are inconsistent. 
Dimson (1979) proposed a methodology that takes this bias into account. Scholes and Williams (1977) 
and Fowler and Rorke (1983) have also developed estimates that take return autocorrelations into 
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reported. 14 The first is based on a statistic obtained by dividing the mean excess return 






































The second statistic we use is obtained by dividing the mean excess return by a cross-































4.2. Time-line of important dates 
The first announcement date considered is the Board Meeting date when the firm 
decides to issue equity. At this date, insider trading is possible. The first public 
announcement of the offering generally comes in the registration statement filed with 
the COB. No newspapers in France cover equity issues, unlike US financial press. 
However, we had access to information in the database of the "Européenne des 
données," which includes all Agence France Presse  (AFP) announcements and those of 
the main French financial newspapers. As a matter of fact, offering announcements by 
                                                 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     17 
 the AFP often take place the day before publication in the financial dailies. Most 
previous studies of securities issues in France analyse the wealth effect at the BALO 
date, which is the legal announcement date.  
The “ Européenne des données ” date (EDD) corresponds to the first mention of the 
offerings in the press. The EDD date is taken into account only if it is earlier than the 
COB date and if the announcement contains the main characteristics of the issue 
(flotation method, size and offer price). Thus, in our study, the announcement date is the 
earlier of the EDD and the COB dates. 15 
In the case of rights issues, there is a required period of seven calendar days 
between the BALO date and the issue date. In the case of public offerings, there is no 
legal period. The issue date is then frequently the same as the BALO date, or even for a 
few offerings the day before. When there is a priority period (which is the case for 16 
out of the 22 public offerings), the subscription period is at least ten days. Figure 1 
reports the time-line for these dates. Table 5 reports the characteristics of these different 
dates in our sample. 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
 
[Insert table 5] 
 
                                                                                                                                               
However, as the normality of daily returns is unproved, a sign test is also used.  
15  We calculated the average announcement effects for each data source separately, and checked that 
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4.3. Valuation effect on the first announcement date (AD)  
The event study is undertaken around two dates (Board Meeting date and the earlier 
of the COB and the EDD dates). No stock price adjustment was detected at the Board 
Meeting date for any of our samples. This date is not usually considered as an 
informative event date. However, Cooney, Kato and Schallheim (1997) use it to study 
the impact of Japanese equity offering announcements, and find a significantly positive 
stock price reaction on this date. The lack of price impact at the board meeting date in 
France may reflect the fact that the offering information does not have to be released 
before the legal announcements. The COB agreement date seems to be a better 
announcement date because the information becomes public on this date at the Latest. 
However, the COB agreement date does not necessarily correspond to the date when the 
information is released. If the offer is first announced through the “ Européenne des 
données ”, the EDD date is selected as the date of announcement, otherwise the COB 
date is chosen for the first date of announcement. The tombstones are published in the 
newspapers only after publication in BALO and refer to the BALO date. Stock price 
reactions around announcement dates are reported in table 6. 16 
 
[Insert table 6] 
 
Table 6 reports the cumulative mean excess return 17 for the two-day event 
window (0,1) where 0 is the announcement date of the offering, for the full sample and 
                                                 
16  Over the period studied in this article, there were no issue cancellations after their announcement. 
17  Only the abnormal returns estimated with Dimson‘s (1979) method are put forward. The other results 
based on the market model (OLS estimates), the index return, and the mean return lead to similar 
conclusions. Only the test based on a time-series standard deviation is shown. The test based on the 
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for the sub-period 1990-1996. For the 1986-1996 period, we find a significant two-day 
average excess return of –0.74% for standby rights issues and –1.11% for uninsured 
rights. 18 Public offerings generate an insignificant and much smaller negative return. 
When we look at the more recent 1990-1996 period, we find a significant two-day 
average excess return of –1.28% for standby rights issues, of –2.84% for uninsured 
rights, and an insignificant negative return for public offerings.  
Due to the small size of the sample of public offerings, table 6 does not 
distinguish between the issues with and without a priority subscription period for 
existing shareholders. All uninsured public offerings contain a priority period. Among 
the 18 underwritten public offerings, 12 have a priority period. We checked that the 
abnormal return at the announcement does not differ according to whether or not a 
priority period exists. 
  Our results for standby rights are comparable to the returns reported in the U.S. 
by Eckbo and Masulis (1992), -1.03%, or Singh (1997) of -1.07% and in Norway by 
Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), -0.23%, but less unfavourable than the results 
reported by Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) in the U.K. (-2.9%). For uninsured rights, we 
find a more negative price reaction, which appears at variance from the Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) prediction that undervalued firms select uninsured rights19. We find an 
insignificant negative wealth effect at the announcement of an underwritten public 
offering, which differs from the –3%, reported in the U.S. studies. 
The characteristics of the French underwritten public offerings help to explain 
our results. In the Eckbo and Masulis (1992) model, the underwriters can only partially 
                                                 
18  We examine how rights offers differ between cases with blockholder guarantees and those without. We 
find that the abnormal return on the announcement date is not significantly different with or without 
blockholder guarantees. 
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certify the firms' quality, which allows for adverse selection effects. However, if the 
underwriter is viewed by the issuer and the market as effective in terms of detecting 
overpriced issues, as argued in Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), underwritten 
offerings may have a significantly positive selection effect or at least a non negative 
effect. Several studies support a certification role for underwriters.  
One of the key features of an underwriting contract is the method of determining 
the offer price. In the U.S. firm commitments, offer prices are set after the initial 
announcement, usually just before the stock issue is sold to investors. In other countries, 
the offer price is set several days before the issue date. Lengthening the time period 
between the determination of the offer price and the issue date increases the likelihood 
of a decline in stock price and the risk borne by the underwriters. They will only 
underwrite an offering if they estimate that the true value of the stock is significantly 
higher than the offer price. 20 An announcement of an underwritten offering can 
therefore be accompanied by a positive or non-negative price reaction.  
Cooney, Kato and Schallheim (1997) report that Japanese firms choose between 
two variants of firm commitment contracts. The first is the fixed-price offering, in 
which the offer price is determined several days before the beginning of the issue. This 
contract provides a high level of certification and elicits a positive abnormal return on 
the announcement date. The second contract, the formula-price offering, provides a 
lower level of certification and results in an insignificant price reaction. In the U.K. 
placing contract, the offer price is also set at the initial announcement. Slovin, Sushka 
and Lai (2000) find a significantly positive excess return, and explain this by the high 
level of certification provided by the placing contract. 
                                                 
20 Due to specifically French regulation contraints, the offer price cannot be set significantly below the 
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French underwritten public offerings are also fixed-price contracts. Further, 
there is a regulatory constraint that requires setting the offer price at least at the average 
of ten consecutive daily stock prices chosen from the twenty daily prices preceding the 
issue date. We argue that, like Japanese firm commitments or U.K. placings, French 
underwritten public offerings are characterised by strong underwriter certification and 
monitoring that may reduce the adverse selection effect of equity offerings and explain 
the non negative wealth effect.  
 
 
4.4. Average abnormal returns on the issue date (ID) 
To investigate the price reaction at the beginning of the subscription period, we 
select the first day of issue and the following twenty days. We can safely assume that it 
is during this period that stockholders in a rights offering decide whether to exercise or 
to sell their rights. From table 7,  we see that the market reaction at the seasoned equity 
issue date is significantly negative. Most studies find insignificant returns on the issue 
date for public offerings (see Asquith and Mullins, 1986 or Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). 
However, Hansen (1988), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Kang and Stulz (1996) and Singh 
(1997) find significant negative returns during the rights offer subscription period. 
In an efficient market, prices should take into account all the information available 
the day the offering is announced. Price changes on the issue day are not the result of 
new information. However, according to some authors (Mikkelson and Partch, 1988 or 
Korajczyck, Lucas and McDonald, 1992), since the issue can be withdrawn after the 
announcement, not withdrawing it indicates that the stock remains overvalued despite 
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period, no offerings were cancelled after registration; consequently, it seems that this 
explanation is not empirically important. 
The other explanations suggested focus on current stockholder and investor 
behaviour on the completion date. According to Lease, Masulis and Page (1991), as 
investors buy stock in the primary market, sellers will exceed buyers in the secondary 
market, bringing prices down at least to the extent of the bid-ask spread. The results 
presented in table 7 show a negative reaction around the issue date for rights issues. The 
extent of the negative reactions around the issue date are very similar to the results of 
Singh (1997) (-2.18% over (-1; +5)) for an underwritten rights issue sample. During the 
first days after the beginning of the subscription period, current shareholders have to 
decide whether to exercise or sell their rights. If they are averse to risk, shareholders 
who want to sell their rights will do so as soon as possible, as long as rights are in the 
money. Investors who buy the rights will buy stock in the primary market rather than in 
the secondary market, bringing secondary market prices down. Furthermore, standby 
underwriters, who have to buy all remaining shares at the end of the subscription period, 
are allowed to buy rights in the secondary market and to short-sell the stock to hedge 
their standby risk exposure. This arbitrage activity may also explain the negative price 
reaction for rights offerings.  
Several previous studies show insignificant results for public offerings on the issue 
date. We find a significant negative abnormal reaction during the days after the 
beginning of the public offering subscription period. In the French context, current 
shareholders may often subscribe first during a priority period and public offerings are 
underwritten through standby contracts. We show that the expected shareholder take-up 
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investors can buy shares in the primary market rather than in the secondary market, 
bringing the stock prices down. We should bear in mind that current shareholders have a 
priority subscription period, but when the main shareholders' take-up is low, outside 
investors may also subscribe immediately: issuers rely on information from 
blockholders concerning their subscription plans to offer part of the issue to investors 
immediatly. This may explain the similar results for rights and public issues around the 
issue date.  
5. Cross-sectional analysis of the announcement effect 
A cross-sectional analysis is undertaken in order to explain the magnitude of mean 
abnormal returns. This analysis makes it possible to observe differences between public 
issues and rights issues around the date of announcement. The dependant variable is the 
two-day excess return at the announcement of equity offerings. Several continuous and 
qualitative variables are included in our analysis.  
 
5.1. Variable definitions 
The continuous variables are defined by the size of the offering, measured by the 
natural logarithm of the gross proceeds (GP), the percentage of the issue offered to 
external investors (EXT), the abnormal performance of the stock over 200 days prior to 
the announcement of the issue (PERF) and a variable that measures the proportion of 
renouncements by blockholders when the firm is closely held (ACTREN).  ACTREN is 
equal to the product of ACT and REN. ACT is equal to 1 if the main shareholder has at 
least 50% of the firm. REN is defined as: 
rsbefore blockholde
rsafter blockholde rsbefore blockholde
Ren
−
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variable is equal to zero if all the blockholders subscribe to their share allocation. It is 
positive if some blockholders renounce their allocation: the proportion of the capital that 
they own decreases after the equity offering. The variable REN increases in proportion 
to renouncements by blockholders, but also, if there are some renouncements, to the 
relative size of the issue. 
The qualitative variables included in the model are defined by dummy variables 
that are equal to one, if the offering is a rights issue (RIG), if the offer is underwritten 
(GARD), if the offering takes place in the later part of the sample period (1990-1996) 
(PERIOD), if the firm is issuing shares in order to acquire another firm or to invest in a 
specified project (USE). 21 
Several other variables were tested but are not reported because of their lack of 
statistical significance. The subscription price discount has no effect on the wealth 
effect at the announcement of the offering in France for the total sample, nor for the 
rights issues sample. This result is similar to the findings of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 
in the U.S. and those of Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) in Norway. It does not 
concur with Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000), who find that the subscription price 
discount negatively affects the price reaction in the U.K. The other variables, not 
reported here, are the shareholder guarantee indicator, the stock beta, the stock return 
standard deviation, the stock residual standard deviation, the size of the issue relative to 
shares outstanding, the nature of control and the stock’s market listing. Results are 
given in table 8 for the total sample of 219 equity offerings. 
 
[Insert table 8] 
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5.2. Flotation method and offering size 
The indicator variable RIG has a significant negative coefficient. The difference 
in the market reaction to rights issues and to public offerings is statistically significant 
after checking for issue characteristics. The announcement effect is greater for rights 
issues than for public offerings. We confirm the results of our previous section: the 
differences in announcement price reactions between the two flotation methods are not 
only due to differences in issue characteristics. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient 
for the underwriting indicator variable GARD is significantly positive at the 10% level. 
Whatever the issuing method, the market reaction is more positive when the offering is 
underwritten. 
The size of the offering has a significantly negative coefficient, indicating a size 
effect in abnormal returns. The size effect is consistent with a price pressure hypothesis, 
but also with information-based explanations. Presumably, the more overvalued the 
equity, the larger the incentive to issue a greater amount of shares. The size effect could 
also be consistent with a moral hazard / free cash flow hypothesis. This hypothesis is all 
the more valid as the gross proceeds increases and the use of proceeds is undefined. 
 
5.3. Prior performance 
The stock runup over 200 days prior to the announcement of the issue, PERF, 
has a significant negative coefficient, suggesting that the adverse selection effects are 
more pronounced when the abnormal performance prior to the offering announcement is 
higher. Asquith and Mullins (1986) document positive abnormal returns in the eleven-
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announcement date. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find a negative relation with a three-
month prior period. Korajczyck et al. (1990) find a negative relation with a short prior 
period and a positive relation with a long prior period, while Bohren, Eckbo and 
Michalsen (1997) find a negative relation with a 40-day prior period. Our results are 
consistent with the Lucas and McDonald (1990) model: overvalued firms issue equity as 
soon as the opportunity arises, while undervalued firms postpone the equity issue until 
the stock price is higher. Thus, on average, the price path prior to the offering for all 
equity issuers will slope upwards, and the stock price will drop at the issue 
announcement.  
According to table 2, no significant difference appears between underwritten 
public offerings and standby rights issues in terms of prior performance. Furthermore, 
the regressions in table 8 show that even after checking for prior performance, public 
offerings result in a more negative abnormal announcement return. This evidence 
cannot be explained by the preference of investment bankers for less risky issues, which 
have not recently experienced a large share price run-up. 22 
 
5.4. Period and use of the funds 
The market reaction becomes more negative during the second period of our 
study (1990-1996). Since 1985, the French market has been gradually deregulated. Bank 
privatisation in 1986-1987 and the arrival of foreign banks induced more competition in 
the financial sector. Further, the importance of foreign pension funds in raising capital 
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period, French firms have become more aware of the necessity of corporate value 
enhancement, and the market has reacted more rapidly and strongly to negative 
announcements. 
The significant positive value for the coefficient on USE indicates that the 
simultaneous announcement of the issue purpose (investment or acquisition) reduces 
information asymmetry between the firm and the investors and therefore the adverse 
selection borne by investors. The market reaction is about 1% more positive when the 
funds are used to acquire another firm or to invest in a specific project (as compared to 
debt reduction or no indication). This is consistent with a lower moral hazard problem 
stemming from increasing management’s discretionary investment capabilities. 
According to Mikkelson and Partch (1986), the use of the proceeds has a small effect on 
price reaction for U.S. firm commitments. Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) find a 
significantly less negative reaction when the proceeds are used for acquisitions only in 
the case of insured rights issues. 
At first glance, the average announcement pattern documented here could be 
explained by the fact that public offerings are more frequently associated with positive 
investment announcements, which could partially offset the negative share price effect 
of the equity announcement. Nevertheless, 61.93% of the rights offerings are associated 
with a specified use of proceeds (12.69% acquisition and 49.24% investment) compared 
to 54.55% for the public offerings (9.09% acquisition and 45.45% investment). 
Therefore, the use of proceeds cannot really explain the different reactions observed at 
the time of announcement of the issues. 
                                                                                                                                               
22  Chen and Ritter (2000) document a clustering of IPO spreads at 7% whatever the risk of the offering. 
Investment banks could therefore restrict themselves to less risky issues. But these authors show that 
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5.5. Ownership structure 
We explore the effects of ownership structure and blockholder rights 
renouncements on the price reaction at the announcement of an equity offering in 
France. We find that the share price effect is negatively related to the percentage of the 
issue offered to outside investors (variable EXT). This result is consistent with results 
found by Eckbo and Masulis (1992): the adverse selection effect grows with the fraction 
of the issue offered to external investors. Nevertheless, the initial part of a subscription 
by external investors can be increased if blockholders renounce their allocation. Our 
evidence shows that blockholder take-up renouncements when the firm is closely held 
have a positive effect on the share price response (variable ACTREN, table 8). 23 We 
report the results for the two sub-samples according to the existence of a controlling 
shareholder (who owns more than 50%) (see table 9). 
 
[Insert table 9] 
 
When the main shareholder owns less than 50% of the capital of the firm, the 
variable REN has a significantly negative impact on the price reaction on the 
announcement of the SEO. In this case, our results are consistent with the Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) model. Adverse selection increases when blockholders renounce their 
allocation. But when the main shareholder owns at least 50% of the capital, the variable 
REN has a significantly positive impact on the price reaction. Blockholder 
                                                                                                                                               
characteristics. We cannot explain our results by the choice by investment banks for public offerings of 
less risky firms. 
23  We obtain similar results with other measures of blockholder renouncement when we consider a sub-
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renouncements enhance value by increasing ownership dispersion. Value enhancement 
may be due to increased liquidity, to better incentives by outside investors to monitor or 
attenuate conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. It is also interesting to 
note that the size effect, which is consistent with a moral hazard / free cash flow 
hypothesis, disappears in the case of majority-controlled firms. The variable PERF has a 
significant negative coefficient only in the case of majority-controlled firms. The 
adverse selection effects are more pronounced when there is a controlling shareholder 
and when abnormal performance prior to the offering announcement is higher. Firms 
that are not closely held by a controlling shareholder are less subject to adverse 
selection. 
As pointed out by Holmström and Tirole (1993), concentrated ownership 
reduces monitoring of the firm by stock market participants, thereby reducing the 
amount of public information available about the firm. This rise in concentration, in 
turn, could increase bid-ask spreads. For instance, Heflin and Shaw (2000) find that 
firms with greater blockholder ownership have larger quoted spread, effective spreads, 
adverse selection spread component, and smaller quoted depths. They argue that 
potential benefits from blockholder monitoring might be partially offset by reduced 
liquidity. Kothare (1997) finds that rights issues are associated with an increase in 
proportional bid-ask spreads, while public underwritten offerings are followed by a 
decrease in proportional bid-ask spreads. These results are consistent with the different 
effects of the two flotation methods on the firm’s ownership structure. Rights issues can 
increase ownership concentration, while public offerings decrease it.  
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) argue that a concentrated ownership 
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active. Ownership concentration involves a trade-off between control and initiative. 
Direct evaluation by a large shareholder may reduce the manager's incentives to exert 
effort. 
Further, the French market is characterised by closely held firms. Majority 
ownership is relatively common. As Schleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest, there may be 
extra costs to concentrated holdings: large investors represent their own interests and 
may treat themselves preferentially at the expense of other investors and employees, 
especially if there is a substantial departure from the one-share-one-vote rule. For most 
firms in France, there is a one-share-two-votes rule when shares are owned on average 
for more than 2 to 4 years. Johnson et al. (2000) focus on tunnelling, which is the 
transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder. Tunnelling 
includes asset sales and contracts that are advantageous to the controlling shareholder, 
loan guarantees and expropriation of corporate opportunities, but also insider trading or 
other financial transactions that discriminate against minorities. Johnson et al (2000) 
show that tunnelling occurs more frequently in civil law countries, such as France. In 
these countries, self-dealing transactions, for instance, are assessed in the light of their 
conformity with statutes, and not on the basis of their fairness to minorities. A growing 
body of research suggests that civil-law countries are less protective of minority 
shareholders than are common-law countries (see La Porta et al., 2000).  
Our results show that the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the 
adverse selection effect for firms with an initial concentrated ownership. When the firm 
is closely held, the announcement of a greater dispersion of share ownership is a 
favourable information for outside investors, because it will reduce the likelihood of 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     31 
own a large part of the shares, minority shareholders may have enhanced power. For 
instance, in France, charter amendment decisions require a majority of 66.6% of the 
voting rights, which is less likely to be reached after an equity offering. 
Our evidence can be compared to the results obtained in other countries. 
According to Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), the proportion of common stock 
held by the 20 largest shareholders has no significant effect on the wealth effect in 
Norway. But they show that the market reacts more favourably to issues for which the 
proportion of insiders (board members and the CEO) is greater. Slovin, Sushka and Lai 
(2000) find a non-linear relation between price reaction and ownership concentration for 
placings in the U.K. Firms with greater ownership sustain a more favourable price 
reaction to placings until ownership concentration reaches 40% of firm shares. For firms 
with ownership concentration greater than 40%, they find a marginal negative effect. On 
the other hand, ownership concentration does not affect excess return on insured rights 
issues in the U.K. According to these authors, U.K. placings entail the sale of the shares 
to outside investors and lower the ownership concentration. These results are 
comparable to ours. 
 
In France, the percentage of blockholder renouncements is significantly larger 
for underwritten public offerings compared to other flotation methods. Two 
simultaneous positive effects can be observed for public offerings: lower costs of 
concentrated ownership, and strong underwriter certification. These effects may 
compensate for the adverse selection effect and may explain the non-negative wealth 
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growing proportion of French firms choose to issue shares through the public offering 
method despite its high flotation costs. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence on the choice of equity flotation method. In 
France, as in most European countries, a rights issue is the primary flotation method. 
Our results show that the direct flotation costs of rights issues are significantly lower 
than the costs of public offerings. The equity financing paradox is confirmed in France: 
a growing proportion of French firms issuing common stocks choose the relatively 
expensive public offering method, rather than the rights method.  
We find that the abnormal returns around the announcement dates are 
significantly negative for rights issues, whether of uninsured or standby rights, and 
negative, but not significantly so, for public offerings. The market reaction is 
significantly more negative for rights issues when checks are made for the other issuing 
characteristics. In the French market, the price of public offerings is set several days 
before the beginning of the issue, and the risk borne by the underwriters is therefore 
larger than the risk of U.S. firm commitments. These characteristics induce strong 
underwriter certification and monitoring that may reduce the adverse selection effect of 
equity offerings and explain the non-negative wealth effect.  
We find a significant negative size effect, consistent with a price pressure 
hypothesis. The price reaction is negatively related to the stock price performance prior 
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used for an acquisition or an investment, which is consistent with a lower adverse 
selection effect. 
We explore the effects of ownership structure and blockholder renouncements 
on the price reaction at the announcement of an equity offering. We show that for firms 
without a controlling shareholder, the adverse selection effect increases with the fraction 
of the issue not taken up by current shareholders, as predicted by Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992). But for closely controlled firms, our evidence shows that blockholder take-up 
renouncements have a positive effect on the share price response. Blockholder 
renouncements imply lower shareholder concentration. This lower concentration 
enhances value by attenuating conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
and, in particular,by  reducing the likelihood of tunnelling. The favourable ownership 
dispersion effect mitigates the adverse selection effect for firms with an initialy large 
concentrated ownership. Finally, the larger flotation costs associated with public 
offerings in France may be offset by the less negative wealth effect at the announcement 
of the issue.  This result helps to understand why a growing proportion of French firms 
are choosing the public offering method. 
 
REFERENCES 
Asquith, P. and D.W. Mullins, 1986, Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, Journal of 
Financial Economics 15, 61-89. 
Bohren O., Eckbo B. and D. Michalsen, 1997, Why Underwrite Rights Offerings? Some 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     34 
Burkart M., Gromb D. and F. Panunzi, 1997, Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the 
Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 693-728. 
Chen H.C. and J.R. Ritter, 2000, The Seven Percent Solution, Journal of Finance, 55, 
1105-1131. 
Cooney J.W., Kato H., and J.S. Schallheim, 1997, Underwriter Certification and 
Japanese Seasoned Equity Issues, Working paper, University of Utah. 
Dimson, E., 1979, Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading, 
Journal of Financial Economics 7, 197-226. 
Eckbo B.E. and R.W. Masulis, 1992, Adverse Selection and the Rights Offer Paradox, 
Journal of Financial Economics 32, 293-332. 
Eckbo, B.E. and R.W. Masulis, 1995, Seasoned Equity Offerings: a survey, in R. Jarrow 
et al. (ed.), Handbooks in OR&MS 9, Elsevier Science, 1017-1072. 
Fowler, D.J. and C.H. Rorke, 1983, Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to 
Infrequent Trading, Comment, Journal of Financial Economics 12, 279-283. 
Gebhardt, G.  and S. Heiden, 1998, Explaining Capital Market Reactions to Equity 
Offers by German Companies, Working paper, University of Frankfurt. 
Hansen, R.S., 1988, The Demise of the Rights Issue, Review of Financial Studies 1, 
289-309. 
Hansen R.S., and J. Pinkerton, 1982, Direct Equity Financing: A Resolution of a 
Paradox, Journal of Finance 37, 651-665. 
Heflin F. and K.W. Shaw, 2000, Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 621-633. 
Hietala, P. and T. Löyttyniemi, 1991, An Implicit Dividend Increase in Rights Issues: 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     35 
Holmström B., and J. Tirole, 1993, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 
Journal of Political Economy 101, 678-709. 
Johnson S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Schleifer, 2000, Tunneling, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90, 22-27. 
Kang, J.K. and R.M. Stulz, 1996, How Different is Japanese Corporate Finance? An 
Investigation of the Information Content of New Equity Issues, Review of Financial 
Studies 9, 109-139. 
Korajczyk, R.A., D.J. Lucas and R.L. McDonald, 1990, Understanding Stock Price 
Behavior around the Time of Equity Issues, in Asymmetric information, corporate 
finance and investment, R.G. Hubbard ed., University of Chicago Press. 
Korajczyk, R.A., D.J. Lucas and R.L. McDonald, 1991, The Effect of Information 
Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues, Review of Financial Studies 4, 
685-708. 
Korajczyk, R.A., D.J. Lucas and R.L. McDonald, 1992, Equity Issues with Time-
Varying Asymmetric Information, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
27, 397-417. 
Kothare M., 1997, The Effect of Equity Issues on Ownership Structure and Stock 
Liquidity: A Comparison of Rights and Public Offerings, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 131-148. 
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Schleifer A., and R. Vishny, 2000, Investor protection 
and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27. 
Lease, R.C., R.W. Masulis and J.R. Page, 1991, An Investigation of Market 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     36 
Loderer, C.F. and H. Zimmerman, 1987, Stock Offerings in a Different Institutional 
Setting: the Swiss Case, Journal of Banking and Finance 12, 353-377. 
Lucas, D.J. and R.L. McDonald, 1990, Equity Issues and Stock Price Dynamics, 
Journal of Finance 45, 1019-1043. 
Masulis, R.W. and A.N. Korwar, 1986, Seasoned Equity Offerings: an Empirical 
Investigation, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 91-118. 
Mikkelson, W.H. and M.M. Partch, 1988, Withdrawn Security Offerings, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, 119-133. 
Schleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of 
Finance 52, 737-784. 
Scholes, M. and J.T. Williams, 1977, Estimating Betas from Non-Synchronous Data, 
Journal of Financial Economics 5, 309-327. 
Singh, A.K., 1997, Layoffs and Underwritten Rights Offers, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 105-130. 
Slovin M.B., Sushka M.E., and W. Lai, 2000, Alternative Flotation Methods, Adverse 
Selection, and Ownership Structure: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Issuance in the 
UK, Journal of Financial Economics, 57, 157-190. 
Smith, C.W., 1977, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights versus 
Underwritten Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 273-307. 
White, H., 1980, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 







































7European Finance Review, 6,3, 291-319.     37 
 
Figure 1 - Time-line of dates used in seasoned equity issues in France 
 
 Board  Meeting  “ Européenne des données ”  Visa COB  BALO    Issue  
  CA    EDD   CD   BD   ID 
Note:  This figure shows the different dates of the process of seasoned equity issues in France, from the Board 
Meeting decision (CA) to the issue date (ID). The BALO date (BD) is the legal date of announcement. 
The first institutional announcement of offering information generally comes in the registration statement 
filed with the COB (CD). The “ Européenne des données ” date (EDD) corresponds to the first mention 
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Table 1  – Equity issues in France from 1986 to 1996 
Year  Uninsured Rights  Rights with standby 
underwriting 
Public offerings  Total 
1986 11  29  3  43 
1987 11  25  2  38 
1988 4  10  0  14 
1989 10  18  1  29 
1990 8  15  3  26 
1991 6  17  8  31 
1992 1  2  2  5 
1993 0  3  1  4 
1994 5  12  1  18 
1995 0  2  0  2 
1996 1  7  1  9 
Total 57  140  22  219 
 
Note:     The data are from COB annual reports. Uninsured rights are rights offerings without bank standby 
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Uninsured public offerings  Underwritten 
public offerings 
All offers 
Number of observations  57  140  4  18  219 














































Number of offerings with an international 
part 
0 0  0  9  9 
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a.  The ratio of subscription price over common stock price is measured by using the price of the stock just before the first date of announcement of the issue. 
b.  The market value of equity is measured by multiplying the stock price just before the announcement of the issue by the number of shares available on that date. 
c.  The percentage of change in the number of shares is calculated by
Number of sharesissued
Number of old shares Number of sharesissued +
. 
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Number of observations  57  140  4  18  219 




















Identity of the largest blockholder (percentage of the total number of offerings for each flotation method) 
No blockholder  1.8  3.6  0  11.1  3.7 
Financial institution  35.1  37.1  50.0  27.8  36.1 
Family or individual investor  10.5  17.9  25.0  22.2  16.4 
Corporate blockholder  52.6  41.4  25.0  16.7  42.0 
State 0  0  0  22.2  1.8 
Percentage of issues with major blockholder subscription guarantee  49.12  20.71  100  27.78  30.14 
Percentage of the offering guaranted by the major blockholders 











Percentage of issues with blockholder take-up renouncements  26.3  28.6  50.0  33.3  28.8 
Share allocation not taken up by blockholders (%)  





















Note:  Blockholders are the shareholders whose names are included in the registration statement filed with the COB (shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares). The means and 
medians of the percentage of shareholder guarantee exclude firms with zero shareholder guarantee. The means and medians of share allocation not taken up by blockholders exclude 
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Table 4 – Cross-sectional regression model of flotation costs for 219 equity 
issues between 1986 and 1996 
 
Variable  Model l  Model 2  Model 3 




























PERIOD     -0.4253*** 
[-2.88] 
Adj R²  0.259 0.415  0.432 
Note:   The dependant variable is the total cost of the issue divided by the gross proceeds (GP), in percentage. 
RIG = Indicator value of 1 if it is a rights issue. Ln(GP) designates the size of the issue (logarithm of the 
gross proceeds). GAR = underwritten percentage of the offer. EXT is the percentage of the issue not taken 
up by blockholders. PERIOD is a dummy variable that equals one when the offering takes place in the 
second period (1990-1996), and zero otherwise. *, **, *** denote significance of the test at the 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels respectively. Tests in brackets are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedastic consistent 







































7Seasoned equity issues in a closely held market  43 
 







































































































Notes:  Figures are trading days. They represent the means, the standard deviations (in parentheses) and the 
medians (in brackets) of the number of trading days between the two dates indicated in the left-hand 
column: 
-  from The “ Européenne des données ” date (EDD) (first mention of an offering in the press) to the BALO 
date (BD) (the legal date of announcement) ; 
-  from the Board Meeting decision (CA) to the BALO date (BD); 
-  the first institutional announcement of offering information that generally comes in the registration 
statement filed with the COB (CD) to the issue date (ID); 
-  from the BALO date (BD) to the issue date (ID); 
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Panel A. 1986-1996 period 
 
Rights offerings 




All public offerings 














































Panel B. 1990-1996 period 
 
Rights offerings 




All public offerings 














































Note:   The event date is the first date of announcement (either EDD or COB) of seasoned equity offerings by 
French firms over the 1986-1996 period. Similar results have been found when considering each of the 
two dates separately. The mean excess returns, calculated by using Dimson’s method, are cumulated over 
the period from 0 to 1 day and from 0 to 5 days. The parametric tests are the tests calculated over the 
cumulative mean abnormal returns,TCtps . Let  nbj  be the number of cumulative abnormal returns, 
RAMC  the cumulative mean abnormal return over  nbj  days,  ( ) RAM σ  the time-series standard-
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All public offerings 


























































Note:   The event date is the offering date of seasoned equity offerings by French firms over the 1986-1996 
period. The mean excess returns, calculated by using Dimson’s method, are cumulated over the period 
from 0 to 1 day, from 0 to 5 days and from 0 to 20 days. The parametric tests represent the tests 
calculated over the cumulative mean abnormal returns,TCtps . Let  nbj  be the number of cumulative 
abnormal returns,  RAMC  the cumulative mean abnormal return over  nbj  days,  () RAM σ  the time-
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Table 8 - Cross-sectional regression model on the announcement date for 219 
equity issues from 1986 to 1996 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 












































































GARD         0.0111 
[1.87]* 
Adj R²  0.05 0.09 0.11  0.12 0.133  0.147 
Note: This table presents the cross-sectional regression model explaining the two-day cumulative excess returns on 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings in France from 1986 to 1996. The event date is the first announcement 
date between EDD and COB. The dependant variable is the two-day cumulative excess return from the 
announcement. The least squares regression models are developed, using hypothesis tests based on consistent 
estimates of covariance matrices allowing for heteroskedasticity, as in White (1980). *, **, *** denote significance 
of the test at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively: t-statistics are in brackets.  
  The continuous variables are the following: 
-  Ln(GP) is the logarithm of the gross proceeds ;  
-  EXT is the percentage of the issue not taken up by blockholders;  
-  PERF designates the long-run abnormal performance of the firm over 200 days prior to the announcement of the issue; 
-  ACTREN is equal to the product of ACT and REN. ACT is equal to 1 if the main shareholder has at least 50% of the 
firm. REN is defined by: 
rsbefore blockholde





  The qualitative variables are as follows: 
-  RIG is an indicator value that has a value of 1 if the offer is a rights issue ; 
-  GARD is a dummy variable that equals one when the offer is underwritten; 
-  PERIOD is a dummy variable that equals one when the offering takes place in the second period (1990-1996); 
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Table 9 - Cross-sectional regression model on the announcement date for two 
subsamples of seasoned equity offerings 
 


























Adj R²  0.122 0.105 
 
 
Note: This table presents the cross-sectional regression model explaining the two-day cumulative excess returns on 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings in France from 1986 to 1996. The event date is the first announcement 
date between EDD and COB. The dependant variable is the two-day cumulative excess return from the 
announcement. The least squares regression models are developed, using hypothesis tests based on consistent 
estimates of covariance matrices allowing for heteroskedasticity, as in White (1980). *, **, *** denote significance of 
the test at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively: t-statistics are in brackets. Firms with a first shareholder who 
owns more than 50% of the capital are designated as majority-controlled firms. 
  The continuous variables are as follows: 
-  Ln(GP) is the logarithm of the gross proceeds ;  
-  PERF designates the long-run abnormal performance of the firm over 200 days prior to the announcement of the issue; 
-  REN is defined by: 
rsbefore blockholde





  The qualitative variable is as follows: 
-  PERIOD is a dummy variable that equals one when the offering takes place in the second period (1990-1996); 
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